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Secular Humanism in Public School Textbooks: Thou
Shalt Have No Other God (Except Thyself)
The Supreme Court has recently developed an increasingly broad
definition of religion for the first amendment in the context of free exer-
cise cases.' As the number and diversity of religions in the United States
continue to grow, interesting issues have arisen in attempts to apply this
broad definition. One of the more notable issues has been raised by con-
servative Christians 2 who have argued that the expansive Supreme Court
definition should be applied to establishment clause cases as well as free
exercise cases, and that secular humanism is a religion under this defini-
tion.3 These conservative Christians argue that the religion of secular
humanism is being endorsed in public school textbooks in violation of
the establishment clause. Several lower federal courts have already ex-
amined this issue with mixed results.
Part I of this note outlines the approaches which courts and com-
mentators have taken in defining "religion" for purposes of the first
amendment and examines whether the same definition of religion should
apply to both the free exercise and establishment clause cases. Part II
describes secular humanism and discusses whether it is a religion for first
amendment purposes. Part III reviews two cases which have ruled on
whether secular humanism was being taught in public school textbooks.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the claim that secular humanism is endorsed by
public school textbooks and suggests that the establishment clause has
been violated when the issue is examined under a faith claim test.
I. The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment
Many conservative Christians have become concerned in recent
years with what they perceive as opposition to traditional theism and mo-
rality in public school textbooks. They believe that separation of church
and state in the classroom has gone beyond mere neutrality toward tradi-
tional Judaeo-Christian religions and has become actively hostile toward
theism.4 In particular, these Christians believe that public school text-
books are promoting the antitheistic religion of secular humanism.
These Christians have brought their claims to the courtroom; their
basic legal argument can be stated in four propositions. First, secular
I The first amendment reads in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2 This note uses the term "conservative Christians" to refer to Christians of both fundamental-
ist and evangelical faiths.
3 Secular humanism is a belief system which rejects the transcendent in favor of the centrality of
man, and faith in favor of reason. See Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular
Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REv. I (1978).
4 "The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages
none." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (quoting Minor v. Bd. of Educ.
of Cincinnati (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1870), reprinted in THE BIBLE IN THE COMMON SCHOOLS
(1870)).
humanism is a religion for purposes of the first amendment.5 Second,
certain public school textbooks advocate secular humanism.6 Third,
state officials' selection of these textbooks constitutes state action in vio-
lation of the establishment clause.7 Finally, to remedy the constitutional
violation, those textbooks that promote secular humanism must be re-
moved from the classroom. 8 Before this legal argument can be ex-
amined, however, the underlying issue of what constitutes "religion" for
purposes of the first amendment must be discussed. Only then can it be
determined whether secular humanism is a religion which falls under the
restrictions of the establishment clause.
A. Supreme Court Criteria for Defining Religion
The Supreme Court has never given a comprehensive definition of
"religion" for purposes of the first amendment. The Court looked to
traditional theism in early attempts at defining religion. In the 1890 case
of Davis v. Beason,9 the Court stated that "the term 'religion' has refer-
ence to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience
to his will."' 10 However, in more recent cases, the Supreme Court has
moved toward a definition of religion that includes nontheistic belief
systems.
The two cases which best express this more recent understanding of
religion are not explicitly constitutional cases. Instead, they are cases in
which conscientious objectors sought exemption from the draft under
statutory law. 11 However, it is generally agreed that the definition of reli-
gion for the statute was constitutionally rather than statutorily
required.
12
5 Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939, 968-71, 980-83 (S.D.
Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
6 Id. at 972-74. See infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
7 Id. at 947, 974.
8 Id. at 946, 988.
9 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
10 Id. at 342. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 612
(1931) ("Religion... embraces human conduct expressive of the relation between man and God.")
11 The federal statute under which the conscientious objectors sought exemption read as
follows:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code.
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.).
12 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (the result was
constitutionally required because otherwise adherents of some religious faiths would be subject to
penalties that adherents of other religions would not be subject to, in violation of the free exercise
clause; the due process clause of the fifth amendment would also be violated since all religions would
not receive equal protection). See also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams,
J., concurring); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 760-61
(1984); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1064 (1978).
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The first of these two cases was United States v. Seeger. 3 Seeger was a
conscientious objector who sought exemption from the draft because of
personal philosophical beliefs which he characterized as religious,
although they had no connection to any recognized religion. 14 The
Court stated that
the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have par-
allel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that
one is "in relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not.15
In Welsh v. United States, 16 the conscientious objector's conviction
against war was formed "by reading in the fields of history and sociol-
ogy.' 7 Although he first denied that his objections to war were based
on religious beliefs, he later declared that his beliefs were "certainly reli-
gious in the ethical sense of the word."' 8 The Supreme Court held that
Welsh was entitled to conscientious objector status because the only two
groups of objectors who are not conscientious objectors by religious
training and belief are those whose "beliefs are not deeply held and
those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or
religious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy,
pragmatism, or expediency."' 9
The Court apparently retreated from equating philosophy with reli-
gion in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 20 In Yoder, Amish parents refused to send their
children, ages fourteen and fifteen, to school beyond the eighth grade,
although state law required children to attend school until reaching age
sixteen.2' In holding that the Amish's right to free exercise of their reli-
gion had been violated, the Court noted that
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evalua-
tion and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a reli-
gious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather
than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the
Religion Clauses.22
13 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
14 Id. at 166. See supra note 11 for the text of the statute under which Seeger sought exemption
from the draft.
15 380 U.S. at 165-66. The Court was influenced in reaching this conclusion by liberal theolo-
gian Paul Tillich's language of "ultimate concern." Id. at 187 (quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF
THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)). An "ultimate concern" is a concern which has to do with human
reality and the meaning and aim of existence. C. APMBRUSTER, THE VISION OF PAUL TILLICH 26
(1967).
16 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
17 Id. at 341. See supra note 11 for the text of the statute under which Welsh sought exemption
from the draft.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 342-43.
20 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
21 Id. at 207.
22 Id. at 216.
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Although Yoder backs away from equating personal philosophy with
religion, it seems to leave intact the Seeger test of looking to whether the
beliefs function in a position parallel to that of traditional religious be-
liefs. 23 So while a personal philosophy might not be religion for pur-
poses of the first amendment, a belief system which functions as
traditional religions function in the lives of their adherents might be reli-
gion for first amendment analysis.
24
B. Lower Federal Courts' Criteria for Religion
While the Supreme Court has avoided giving a more comprehensive
definition of religion, lower federal courts have had occasion to build on
the Supreme Court's definition. In Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 25 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the appellants had made out a prima facie case that Scientology was
a religion for purposes of the first amendment. 26 In finding that
Scientology was a religion, the court found it important that Scientology
had licensed ministers with legal authority to marry and bury and that its
doctrine contained an account of man and his nature "comparable in
scope, if not in content, to those of some organized religions." 27 The
fact that Scientology was nontheistic did not preclude if from being clas-
sified as a religion.
28
In Malnak v. Yogi, 29 the Third Circuit held that teaching Transcen-
dental Meditation in the NewJersey public schools violated the establish-
ment clause.30 Judge Arlin Adams filed a concurring opinion in Malnak
in order to give greater insight into the court's expansive reading of reli-
gion in the first amendment.
3'
Essentially, the Court set up two "poles" of belief. At one end, there is purely religious
belief, exemplified by the Amish, and at the other, there is purely philosophical belief, ex-
emplified by Thoreau.... [T]he Court suggested that an inquiry should be made to deter-
mine where the belief at issue falls on this continuum ....
Note, Secular Humanism, the Establishment Clause, and Public Education, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1161 n.
103 (1986).
Justice Douglas, dissenting, disagreed with the Court's retreat from equating philosophy with
religion, and felt that it was contrary to Welsh and Seeger. 406 U.S. at 247-48 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
23 See Note, supra note 22, at 1161-62.
24 For a more complete overview of the history of the definition of religion in Supreme Court
cases, as well as an analysis of the framers' intent in drafting the first amendment, see Whitehead &
Conlan, supra note 3, at 2-15. But see Davidow, "Secular Humanism" as an "Established Religion" A
Response to Whitehead and Conlan, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 51 (1979) (arguing that Whitehead and Con-
Ian fail to reconcile two pieces of evidence which contradict their thesis that the framers did not
intend the first amendment to prevent an establishment of Christianity but instead intended to avoid
the domination of one Christian denomination over the others).
25 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
26 Id. at 1162. In Founding Church, the Church of Scientology appealed a judgment requiring
condemnation and destruction of Scientology "E-meters" for being devices with false and mislead-
ing labeling and for lacking adequate directions for use in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. Id. at 1148. The court held that literature which was religious doctrine could not be used in a
finding of false labeling. 1d. at 1162.
27 Id. at 1160.
28 Id.
29 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
30 Id. at 199.
31 Id. at 200.
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Judge Adams looked to three criteria in determining what consti-
tuted religion for purposes of the first amendment. First, the "religion"
must address fundamental questions, "the deeper and more impondera-
ble questions-the meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe,
the proper moral code of right and wrong .... ,,32 Secondly, the "reli-
gion" must provide comprehensive answers to these fundamental ques-
tions. 3s Providing an answer to only one fundamental question would
not suffice; the "religion" would have to provide "a systematic series of
answers."' 34 Thirdly, a court should examine whether the "religion" has
any of the traditional external indicia of religion such as "formal services,
ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization,
efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar manifes-
tations associated with the traditional religions."35 Judge Adams noted
that a religion could exist without any of these outward signs, and their
absence should not be dispositive. 36
A three judge panel for the Third Circuit accepted Judge Adams'
three criteria two years later in Africa v. Pennsylvania.s7 In Africa, Judge
Adams, writing for the court, held that an organization of prisoners
named MOVE, which belived in absolute peace, purity in nature, and the
necessity of limiting one's diet to raw foods, was not a first amendment
religion because it met none of the three criteria.3 8
Essentially, the lower federal courts have only refined the criteria set
out by the Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh.3 9 In Founding Church, the
criterion of looking to the comprehensiveness of the religion's account of
man and his nature is equivalent to the parallel position test in Seeger.40
A belief system which gives a comprehensive account of man and his na-
32 Id. at 208. Judge Adams found that Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental Medita-
tion met this criterion because it held to the existence of a fundamental life force and dealt with the
nature of man and his world, the sustaining force of the universe, and the way to find happiness. Id.
at 213. Fundamental questions are equivalent to questions of ultimate concern, discussed supra note
15.
33 Id. at 209. Judge Adams found that this criterion was met, for even though SCITM was not as
comprehensive as some religions and had no complete moral code, it addressed enough fundamen-
tal questions that it was more than an ideology driven by only one isolated theory. Id. at 213.
34 Id. at 209.
35 Id. Judge Adams found that this criterion was met because of SCITM's ceremonies, trained
teachers, and organization even though it lacked clergy and marriage and burial rites. Id. at 214.
36 Id. at 209.
37 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). The court noted thatJudge
Adams' concurring opinion in Malnak did not "purport to have isolated the only possible factors that
could be used to 'test' for the presence of a religion." Id. at 1032 n. 13.
38 Id. at 1026-28, 1033-36. Other MOVE beliefs included opposition to all that was wrong,
ending all violence, and returning to nature. MOVE had no ceremonies, rituals, or holidays, but did
consider every act of life to be full of religious significance. Id. at 1026-28.
In applying the three Malnak criteria to MOVE, the Third Circuit first found that MOVE ad-
dressed no ultimate fundamental questions except perhaps some notion that man's role in the uni-
verse was to live in harmony with nature. Id. at 1033. Secondly, MOVE's ideology was not
comprehensive, but was limited to its single fundamental ideal of "philosophical naturalism." Id. at
1035. Lastly, MOVE had no special services, rituals, holidays, catechism, or organizational structure
and therefore lacked the traditional external indicia of religion. Id. at 1036.
39 Judge Adams' three criteria in Malnak and Africa amount to a "definition by analogy" ap-
proach which is "a refinement and an extension of the 'parallel'-belief course first charged by the
Supreme Court in Seeger." Id. at 1036.
40 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for the Founding Church criteria. See supra note 15
and accompanying text for the Seeger parallel position test.
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ture fills a role parallel to that of traditional religion. Judge Adams' first
two criteria in Malnak and Africa expand the parallel position test by de-
fining when a belief system will occupy a position parallel to that of tradi-
tional religion. 41 Under Judge Adams' first two criteria, a belief system
meets Seeger's parallel position test when it addresses fundamental ques-
tions and does so in a comprehensive manner. The only criterion which
these cases have added which goes beyond refinement of the Seeger test is
that of looking to whether traditional external indicia such as ritual and
organization exist.
42
C. A Unitary Definition Versus a Bifurcated Definition
Before turning to the question of whether secular humanism meets
these criteria for religion, one further issue regarding the definition of
religion must be addressed. This issue is whether the definition of reli-
gion should be the same for both the free exercise and the establishment
clauses. Some commentators have suggested that religion should be
given different meanings for the two clauses. 43 These commentators be-
lieve that a broad reading of the free exercise clause would maximize
protection of individual religious rights while a narrow reading of the
establishment clause would avoid the possibility that all "humane" gov-
ernment programs could be deemed constitutionally suspect as an estab-
lishment of religion. 4
4
Several problems exist with this bifurcated reading, however. First,
the word "religion" appears only once in the first amendment. To claim
that "religion" could have different meanings for the two clauses would
contradict a plain reading of the amendment. 45 Secondly, a bifurcated
41 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for a description ofJudge Adams' first two crite-
ria for defining religion.
42 This is Judge Adams' third criterion in Malnak and Africa. See supra notes 35-36 and accompa-
nying text. Even this third criterion can be seen as merely an extension of the parallel position test
since if ritual is incorporated in the belief system, it is more likely to function as religion for the
adherent.
43 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrIo'rONAL LAW § 14-6, at 827-28 (1978); Note, supra note 12, at
1083-86.
44 "To borrow the ultimate concern test from the free exercise context and use it with present
establishment clause doctrines would be to invite attack on all programs that further the ultimate
concerns of individuals or entangle the government with such concerns." Note, supra note 12, at
1084.
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 43, § 14-6, at 827-28. Professor Tribe fears that ifa broad definition
of religion is given for the establishment clause that legislation advancing human dignity, freedom,
or morality could be invalidated as an establishment of religion. Id. at 831. Therefore, Professor
Tribe proposes that the definition of religion be bifurcated for the first amendment. For the free
exercise clause, anything "arguably religious" should be considered religion, but for the establish-
ment clause, anything "arguably nonreligious" should not be considered religion. Id. at 828.
45 Although the Constitution has often been subject to a broad construction, it remains a
written document. It is difficult to justify a reading of the first amendment so as to support
a dual definition of religion, nor has our attention been drawn to any support for such a
view in the conventional sources that have been thought to reveal the intention of the
framers.
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 211-12 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra note 1 for the text of the first amend-
ment.
The legislative history behind the drafting of the first amendment appears to support the propo-
sition that the framers were defining religion in terms of theism for both clauses. See M. MALBIN,
RELIGION AND PoLIcs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978). But see
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reading would result in three categories of beliefs. 46 The first category
would be those belief systems which are not religion for either clause and
therefore would not receive the protections of the free exercise clause or
the restrictions of the establishment clause. The second category would
be those belief systems which are religion for both clauses and would
receive the protections of the free exercise clause and the restrictions of
the establishment clause. The third category of beliefs would be pro-
tected by the free exercise clause but not subjected to the restrictions of
the establishment clause. In effect, this third category of beliefs would be
given preferred status over other belief systems without any reason for
giving it such status.47 A third problem with a bifurcated reading, the
possibility that government programs will be subject to wholesale invali-
dation under a broad definition of religion for the establishment clause,
is probably overstated. Humane government programs should not be
invalidated if they are based on some ultimate concern such as human
dignity, merely because a program based on only one ultimate concern
would fail the criterion of comprehensiveness. 48 Because of the analyti-
cal problems presented by the bifurcated reading of the religion clauses,
and because courts have not been responsive to attempts to promote this
reading,49 this note will apply the unitary reading of the religion clauses
in determining whether secular humanism is a religion.
Note, supra note 12, at 1060 (although the framers believed religion entailed a relationship between
man and a Supreme Being, no clear evidence exists that the framers wanted to protect only theism).
Nothing in the legislative history supports a dual definition of religion, especially any sort of "argua-
bly religious/arguably nonreligious" dichotomy.
46 See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212-13 (dual definition creates three categories of beliefs); Greena-
walt, supra note 12, at 813-15 (Tribe's definition creates a broad intermediate category that could
protect even Marxism and use of psychedelic drugs as arguably religious while not subjecting them
to establishment clause restrictions).
47 592 F.2d at 212-13. Arguably, this would make the third category "officially preferred be-
liefs." Note, supra note 22, at 1160.
There is no reason to distinguish in ideological matters between different comprehensive
world views, calling some religion and some not. A more plausible interpretation is to
consider, in the context of the marketplace of ideas, that the ideological competitors of
religion are religion for both clauses of the first amendment.
Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality By Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 154 (1985).
48 592 F.2d at 212. In Malnak, Judge Adams argues that criticisms about possible "wholesale
invalidation" of government programs are unfounded because that would be too broad a reading of
Seeger, Welsh, and Torcaso. A government program would have to be based upon a comprehensive set
of ultimate concerns rather than just a single such ultimate concern. And even if a program was
supported for religious reasons, that alone would not invalidate it if the law or program itself is
constitutional. Id. See also Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
605-06 (arguing that a dual definition of religion is not necessary to avoid invalidation of large num-
bers of government programs).
49 In Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Rutledge, writing for four dissenters,
rejected a bifurcated definition of religion. "Religion appears only once in the Amendment. But the
word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow
to forbid 'an establishment' and another, much broader, for securing 'the free exercise thereof.' "
Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The views of the four dissenters on the unitary definition were
not disputed by the majority in Everson.
Judge Adams also rejected a bifurcated definition in Malnak. 592 F.2d at 213. In a footnote,
Judge Adams noted that the majority of the court also appeared to implicitly reject a bifurcated
definition. Id. at 211 n. 51. See also Oaks, Separation, Accomodation and the Future of Church and State, 35
DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 9-10, 22 (1985) (predicting that the Supreme Court will develop a single defini-
tion of religion for both clauses equivalent to the broad definition it has currently given for the free
exercise clause). But see Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir.) (Canby,
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II. Secular Humanism as a Religion
Having defined religion for purposes of the first amendment, the
next step is to examine secular humanism and determine whether it
meets the criteria for classification as a religion. A description of secular
humanism's tenets and organization will be necessary.
A. A Description of Secular Humanism
The term "humanism" generally refers to a "devotion to the human-
ities . .. characterized by a revival of classical letters, an individualistic
and critical spirit."5 0 The term "secular humanism," however, has mark-
edly different connotations. 51
Secular humanists have set down in writing their basic belief system
in three main works since their formation. These three writings are the
Humanist Manifesto I, the Humanist Manifesto 1I, and A Secular Humanist Dec-
laration.52 In the Humanist Manifesto II, secular humanists divided their
"creed" into five basic areas:
1. Religion: Religions which place God above humans do a disser-
vice. "We find insufficient evidence for belief in the existence of a super-
natural: it is either meaningless or irrelevant to the question of the
survival and fulfillment of the human race. As nontheists, we begin with
humans not God, nature not deity." Teachings of eternal salvation or
damnation are "illusory and harmful" because they "distract humans
from present concerns .. .
2. Ethics: Morals and ethics are to be based on man, and are "au-
tonomous and situational." Meaning in life is found through creativity and
development. Reason is the most effective means for solving human
problems, but reason should be balanced by humility and compassion.5 4
3. The individual: The dignity of an individual and his self-actuali-
zation are of cardinal importance.55
J., concurring) (implying that a bifurcated definition might best serve the purposes of the religion
clauses), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
50 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (1986). "In this century the label has
been appropriated by those who reject all religious beliefs, insisting that we should be exclusively
concerned with human welfare in this, allegedly, the only world." A DICrIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 153
(2d ed. 1984).
51 According to Dr. Russell Kirk, the term "secular humanism" came into being as a result of a
battle for the use of the term "humanism" by a group of ethical humanists and a group of religious
humanists in the late 20's and early 30's. The ethical humanists, led by Irving Babbitt and Paul
Elmer More, emphasized classical disciplines and the study of the humanities. The religious human-
ists were led by John Dewey and his followers. Both groups proclaimed themselves American hu-
manists, and the term "secular humanists" eventually was applied to the group of religious
humanists to distinguish them from the ethical humanists. Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mo-
bile County, 655 F. Supp. 939, 961-62 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
52 Humanist Manifesto I, 6 NEw HuMANIST (May-June 1933) (signed by 34 prominent humanists,
includingJohn Dewey); Humanist Manifesto II, reprinted in P. KURTz, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMAN-
iSM 39 (1983) [hereinafter Humanist Manifesto II] (signed by more than 275 prominent intellecuals,
including Isaac Asimov, Sidney Hook, Corliss Lamont, Andrei Sakharov, and B.F. Skinner); A Secular
Humanist Declaration, reprinted in P. KUR-Z, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMANISM 14 (1983) [hereinafter
Declaration].
53 Humanist Manifesto II, supra note 52, at 41-42.
54 Id. at 42-43.
55 Id. at 43. Humanist Manifesto II noted that because of this tenet any religion, ideology, or
moral code which denigrates the individual should be rejected. In reference to the individual, sod-
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4. Democratic society: The individual must have a wide range of
civil liberties.
5 6
5. World community: A world community should be developed
through "a system of world law and a world order based upon transna-
tional federal government.
'57
A Secular Humanist Declaration adds to this list of beliefs those of the
importance of moral education in public schools, the immorality of in-
doctrinating children in religion, and support of the theory of
evolution.
58
These three main documents enumerate the secular humanist belief
system. It is a belief system which rejects the transcendent and substi-
tutes an emphasis on the centrality of man. It stresses the importance of
reason over faith, both for solving the world's problems and for develop-
ing a system of ethics and morals. Secular humanism also has organiza-
tional structure, with a segment functioning as churches but with a
limited amount of ritual. 59
B. An Examination of Secular Humanism Under the Criteria for Religion
Having briefly examined what secular humanism is, it must next be
determined whether secular humanism meets the first amendment crite-
ety must also recognize the right to birth control, abortion, divorce, and sex between consenting
adults. Id.
56 Id. at 43-45. These civil liberties include not only the freedoms recognized in the Bill of
Rights, but also the right to die with dignity, euthanasia, and the right to suicide. Id. at 43. In regard
to democratic society, Humanist Manifesto I also places among its tenets that participatory democracy
must be extended to "the economy, the school, the family, the workplace, and voluntary associa-
tions." Id. at 44. Separation of church and state is imperative. Economic systems should be tested
by whether they further individual economic well-being. Discrimination must be eliminated, and
everyone should have a right to education at any level. Id. at 44-45.
57 Id. at 45.
58 Declaration, supra note 52, at 18, 20. Organization and ritual is also important in determining
whether a belief system is religion. A number of organizations are dedicated to the promotion of
secular humanism. These include the American Humanist Association, American Ethical Union, Fel-
lowship of Religious Humanists, Society for Humanistic Judaism, Council for Democratic and Secu-
lar Humanism, and the Canadian Humanist Association. P. KuR-z, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR
HUMANISM 177 (1983). In addition, secular humanism has had influence in the Unitarian Church.
Id. at 189. The American Humanist Association has been recognized as a religious minority and has
sought first amendment protection. Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F.Supp.
939, 970 (S.D. Ala.) rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987). See also Fellowship of Humanity v. County
of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (the humanist group
Fellowship of Humanity was recognized as a religion under the United States Constitution and given
exemption from property taxes). The American Humanist Society also certifies humanist counselors
who have the legal status of ministers. Smith, 655 F.Supp. at 970. Some of the secular humanist
groups function as churches and have incorporated rituals such as burial services. Id. at 971. The
Ethical Culture Society functions as a church. Id. See also Fellowship of Humanity, 315 P.2d at 397
(humanist group Fellowship of Humanity functioned similarly to a church). But note that humanist
organizations are relatively small. As of 1983, the American Humanist Association had 3,500 mem-
bers, the American Ethical Union 3,500 members, the Society for Humanistic Judaism 4,000 mem-
bers, and the Fellowship of Religious Humanists 300 members. P. KuR-rZ, supra, at 189. The secular
humanist movement is much broader than those who actually adhere to one of the organized
groups, and, according to Dr. Kurtz, it is the dominant moral and religious point of view among
intellectuals. Id. at 135. Secular humanists promote their views through several magazines dedicated
to humanist discussion. Smith, 655 F.Supp. at 981. These magazines are FREE INQUIRY, THE HUMAN-
iST, and PROGRESSIVE WORLD.
59 See id.
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ria for classification as a religion. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 60 the Supreme
Court recognized that first amendment rights extend to nontheistic reli-
gions. The Court stated that "[a]mong religions in this country which do
not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others."' 6 1 However, this statement is probably not dispositive of the is-
sue since it is dictum and since, as Judge Adams noted in Malnak, it does
not necessarily "stand for the proposition that 'humanism' is a religion,
although an organized group of 'Secular Humanists' may be."
62
On the lower court levels, the courts have generally avoided the
question of whether secular humanism is a religion. They have side-
stepped the issue by assuming for the sake of argument that secular hu-
manism is a religion, but then finding that secular humanism has not
been established in violation of the first amendment. 63 The district court
decision in Smith v. "Board of SchoolCommissioners of Mobile County 64 has been
the only court to determine whether secular humanism is a religion.
The district court in Smith held that secular humanism is a religion
for both free exercise and establishment clause purposes. 65 The Smith
court noted that secular humanism has an organizational structure that
attempts to proselytize, leaders who are recognized as authorities, and
"diversity of views and philosophies within the humanist community very
similar to the schisms and debates existing within the Christian, Jewish
and Muslim communities."
66
Turning to the content of the beliefs of secular humanism, the Smith
court found that secular humanism's most important belief was its denial
of the transcendent. 67 The court found that this belief was a faith as-
sumption, which resulted in secular humanism being a first amendment
60 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
61 Id. at 495 n. 11.
62 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979). Judge Adams was noting that the Supreme
Court's statement was followed by reference to a case in which an organized group of secular hu-
manists recieved tax exempt status as a religion. See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,
133 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). But note that a number of cases have
referred to this Supreme Court dictum as conclusive. See Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness v.
Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1981); Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (W.D.
Va. 1983); Van Schaik v. Church of Scientology of Calif., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1143 (D. Mass.
1982); Lovey v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1194 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
63 See Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987);
Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985).
64 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
65 Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 982. The court implied acceptance of a unitary definition of religion for
the first amendment. Id. at 975-80.
66 Id. at 981.
67 Id. This belief was found to be the foundation of secular humanism. If no supernatural realm
exists, the universe is then completely physical and knowable through reason. Since there is no
supernatural, man's highest goal is self-fulfillment, and any moral code which he follows should be
based upon himself. Id.
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religion. 68 The court held this over the protests of adherents claiming
that secular humanism was not a religion.
69
If secular humanism is examined under Judge Adams' three criteria
in Malnak, one can see that secular humanism is not easily classified. 70
Secular humanism does answer fundamental questions and does so in a
comprehensive manner. 71 But under the third criterion, while secular
humanism does have some of the traditional external indicia of religion,
it does not have structures and rituals that are nearly as extensive as most
traditional religions. 72 But as Judge Adams noted, the third criterion is
the least important of the three, and absence of such external indicia is
not determinative. 73 Since secular humanism tests positive under the
first two criteria and not completely negative under the third, secular hu-
manism should be considered a religion for purposes of the first
amendment.
74
68 Id. at 982. Specifically, the court said that it was a faith statement to claim:
that observable data is all that is real. A statement that there is no scientific proof of tran-
scendental or supernatural reality is a religious statement. A statement that there is no scien-
tific proof of supernatural or transcendent reality is irrelevant and nonsensical, because
inquiry into the fundamental nature of man and reality itself may not be confined solely
within the sphere of physical, tangible, observable science.... If there is no evidence, the
theory, one way or the other, has nothing to do with science.
Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of whether secular humanism is a
religion. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
69 Id. at 969-70, 982. However, Dr. Paul Kurtz, a leader of the secular humanist movement,
admitted that there is sharp division within the movement itself over whether it is a religion and that
he himself held at one time that it is a religion. Id. at 969-70. Humanist Manifesto I refers to the
beliefs as religious and states that the supporters of the Manifesto wished to establish a new religion.
HumanistManifesto I, supra note 52. According to Dr. Russell Kirk, John Dewey, one of the founders
of the movement, claimed that he was trying to found a religion. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 969. To the
extent that secular humanism's adherents claim that it is not a religion, note the Supreme Court's
statement in Welsh: "The Court's statement in Seeger that a registrant's characterization of his own
belief as 'religious' should carry great weight... does not imply that his declaration that his views
are nonreligious should be treated similarly." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
And as Judge Adams pointed out in Malnah, "Supporters of new belief'systems may not 'choose' to
be non-religious, particularly in the establishment clause context." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
210 n. 45 (3d Cir. 1979).
70 For Judge Adams's three criteria, see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
71 Secular humanism answers a number of questions of ultimate concern. As to the question of
the existence of a Supreme Being, it denies the existence of any supernatural realm. As to the mean-
ing of life and death, it answers that life has no ultimate meaning beyond what we are able to give to
it. As to man's role in the universe, it answers that our highest goal is to seek creative self-fulfill-
ment. As to a moral code, it states that there are no absolute right and wrongs, but that morals
should be based upon man and determined from reason. This moral code is not as in depth as the
moral codes of most traditional religions, but it does provide a means for "discovering" morals.
Certain other moral tenets are laid out by secular humanism as well, including the immorality of
indoctrinating children in religion, recognizing the dignity of the individual, the importance of bal-
ancing reason with compassion, and the morality of sexual freedom. See supra notes 52-58 and ac-
companying text.
72 Secular humanism has no worship, prayer, or chants. Those secular humanists who do en-
gage in its limited organization and ritual are only a small portion of its adherents. See supra notes
58, 66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the external structure and ritual of secular
humanism.
73 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
74 See also Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 30-31 (secular humanism is a religion which
worships man as the source of knowledge and truth); Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious
Effects, and Humanistic Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 n. 71 (1982) (secular humanism is easily
classified as religious).
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i1. Secular Humanism in Public School Textbooks
Two major cases have examined the question of whether secular hu-
manism is being promoted in public school textbooks. Although both
cases presented the issue of whether secular humanism was being pro-
moted by public school textbooks, the types of teaching that the plaintiffs
claimed were secular humanist differed markedly.
A. Grove v. Mead School District No. 354
In Grove v. Mead School District No. 354,75 Cassie Grove claimed that
The Learning Tree, a book in the sophomore literature curriculum, was
promoting secular humanism in violation of the establishment clause.
76
The Learning Tree was a novel about life and racism from the perspective
of a black youth.77 It contained a number of comments denigrating
Christianity, such as a reference to "Jesus Christ, the long-legged white
son of a bitch."
78
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
use of The Learning Tree in the public schools did not violate the establish-
ment clause.79 The court noted that the establishment clause requires
government neutrality toward religion, and that to avoid an establish-
ment clause violation, state action must pass the three part test enunci-
ated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.80 The plaintiffs had contended that the book
had the primary effects of advancing secular humanism and inhibiting
Christianity,8' but the court concluded that the primary effects were sec-
ular, since only a minor portion of the book contained comment on
religion.8
2
Unlike the majority opinion in Grove, Judge Canby, in his concurring
opinion, discussed whether the textbook passed the purpose and entan-
glement prongs of the Lemon test. Judge Canby concluded that the text-
book had been included for the nonreligious purpose of exposing
students to the attitudes and viewpoints of different cultures, and it
therefore satisfied the purpose prong.8 3 He concluded that the textbook
also satisfied the entanglement prong, since secular humanist groups
neither sanctioned nor provided the textbook.
8 4
75 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
76 Grove, 753 F.2d. at 1531.
77 Id. at 1534.
78 Id. at 1547. Other passages which the plaintiffs characterized as secular humanism included
statements by the characters in the novel doubting the existence of heaven and hell, the importance
or credibility of religion, a passage referring to homosexuality, and a reference to "a poor white
trash God." Id. at 1543-52.
79 Id. at 1534.
80 Id. The Lemon test requires that the state action (1) have a secular purpose, (2) the primary
effect of which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876
(1971).
81 Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826
(1985).
82 Id. No free exercise problem existed since the teacher did not force Cassie to read the book
but instead assigned her alternate reading. Id. at 1531, 1533-34.
83 Id. at 1539 (Canby, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 1538. Plaintiffs had contended that the state had flunked the entanglement prong be-
cause the state was not merely entangled with religious agencies but was itself the agency of antireli-
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In examining the effect prong of the test, Judge Canby noted that a
preliminary problem was that the plaintiffs seemed to regard secular hu-
manism and antireligion as synonomous.85 This forced him to analyze
whether the textbook had the primary effect not only of advancing secu-
lar humanism, but also of inhibiting Christianity. 6 Judge Canby noted
that it would not suffice for the textbook to confer an indirect, remote, or
incidental benefit on religion,8 7 but that it must instead "communicate a
message of governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion."8 8
Judge Canby decided that The Learning Tree did not communicate govern-
mental endorsement of secular humanism or disapproval of Christianity
because the book was fiction, only tangentially concerned with religion,
rather than a book of "dogmatic philosophy" teaching religious view-
points as truth.8 9 Because the book was being used for a literature class,
"[t]o include the work no more communicates governmental endorse-
ment of the author's or characters' religious views than to assign Paradise
Lost, Pilgrim's Progress, or The Divine Comedy would convey endorsement or
approval of Milton's, Bunyan's, or Dante's Christianity." 90
B. Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County
In Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County,91 the plain-
tiffs argued that public school textbooks selected by the Alabama Text-
book Selection Committee violated the establishment clause by
promoting secular humanism and inhibiting Christianity. 92 The text-
books in question fell into two categories. One category consisted of
high school history and grade school social studies textbooks which omit-
ted facts about Christianity's role in American history to such an extent
that the plaintiffs claimed it inhibited Christianity and promoted secular
humanism. 93 The second category consisted of home ecomonics text-
books which the plaintiffs claimed promoted secular humanism by mak-
ing antitheistic statements, such as "[y]ou are the most important person
gion. Judge Canby dismissed this contention by stating that plaintiffs failed to recognize that
government could exclude religious influence and remain nonreligious as opposed to antireligious.
Id. at 1536, 1538.
85 Id. at 1535-36.
86 Id. at 1535-36, 1540.
87 Id. at 1539. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683, reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
88 Grove, 753 F.2d at 1539 n. 17 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
89 Id. at 1540.
90 Id. at 1540-41.
91 Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827
F.2d 684 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
92 Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 946, 949.
93 Id. at 946. Specific facts about Christianity which the history and social studies textbooks left
out included the religious significance of the history of the Puritans and any mention of the Great
Awakenings. The textbooks either failed to mention colonial missionaries or presented them as
oppressors of native Americans. Religious influence on the abolitionist, women's suffrage, temper-
ance, civil rights and peace movements were either not mentioned or treated as insignificant. The
role of religion in the lives of immigrants and minorities was ignored. The textbooks rarely men-
tioned religion's role in the time period after the Civil War at all. Id. at 983-84.
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in your life" (rather than God), and by statements teaching that morals
are relative to man, such as "[m]orals are rules made by people." 94
1. The District Court Decision
ChiefJudge Hand of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Alabama held that the history, social studies, and home
economics textbooks all violated the establishment clause.95 After deter-
mining that secular humanism is a religion for purposes of the first
amendment,96 Judge Hand gave his analysis of how the history and social
studies textbooks violated the establishment clause.
Since the plaintiffs did not claim that the history and social studies
books made actual antireligious comments but rather that they consist-
ently omitted significant facts about religion's role in American history,
Judge Hand first decided that omissions in textbooks could rise to the
level of a first amendment violation.9 7 Judge Hand then determined that
references to religion had been omitted for the impermissible religious
purpose that secular humanists wished to exclude any influence of theis-
tic religions from the public schools.98 As for whether a valid secular
reason existed for teaching facts about religion's role in history, Judge
Hand pointed not only to the secular purpose of providing the student
with a more complete understanding of history but also to the possibility
that it would better enable the student to develop informed religious be-
liefs and exercise his first amendment religious freedoms. 99
94 Id. at 972-73, 999, 1003. Statements in the home economics textbooks which the plaintiffs
claimed promoted the view that values and morals are relative to man as opposed to the possibility
that there might be absolute right and wrongs included statements telling the student that he is the
only one who can decide what is right and wrong and that values are "personal and subjective." Id.
at 973. Other teachings which the plaintiffs said promoted morals centered on man included state-
ments such as "[w]hat is right and wrong seems to depend more upon your own judgment than on
what someone tells you to do;" "[i]t takes time and experience for people to arrive at the beliefs best
for their life;" "[t]oo strict a conscience may make you ... feel different and unpopular [and n]one of
these feelings belongs to a healthy personality;" "[o]nly you can judge your own values;" and "what
is right for one person is not necessarily right for another." Id. at 1001-04.
Statements which the plaintiffs said were antitheistic teachings included stating that the basic
types of needs which everyone has are "physical, emotional, mental, and social" (omitting spiritual
needs); "[s]elf-actualization is the highest level of human need" (rather than knowing and serving
God); and "[d]ivorce was considered a sin against God [and miany people thought it immoral and an
indication of a weak or poor character" (implying that it is outmoded to so think today). Id. at 999-
1001. Appendix N of the district court opinion contains a comprehensive list of passages plaintiffs
considered objectionable, including passages which the plaintiffs said taught hedonism and an-
tifamily values. Id. at 999-1013.
95 Id. at 988.
96 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
97 Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939, 984 (S.D. Ala.), reu'd,
827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987). The proposition that omissions could constitute a first amendment
violation was based on Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Judge Hand stated that in Epper-
son the Supreme Court decided that an Arkansas law mandating the omission of the teaching of
evolution in Arkansas public schools and universities rose to a first amendment violation since the
subject was excluded for religious reasons and valid secular reasons existed for teaching the subject.
Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 984. See infra note 115 for the Eleventh Circuit's holding on this proposition.
98 Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 984. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a description of
secular humanism's antitheistic tenets.
99 Id. at 984-85. Judge Hand explained that the history and social studies textbooks had strayed
so far from giving a balanced view of historical facts about religion that it rose to the level of ideolog-
ical promotion. By implying "that people's actions, behaviors, jobs, schooling, [and] their very lives
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Turning to the home economics textbooks, expert testimony agreed
that these textbooks attempted to teach students a method for develop-
ing morals and values known as values clarification which was based on
humanistic psychology. 100 Judge Hand found humanistic psychology to
be an outgrowth of secular humanism, 1 1 although some of the experts
had given textimony to the contrary.' 02
The court noted that for the student to accept what was taught in the
home economics textbooks would necessarily require him to believe faith
assumptions about "human nature, the origin and nature of the rules
governing human relationships, the non-existence of supernatural or
transcendent reality, and the purpose of human existence individually
are based on anything but religion" students tend to "think differently about their belief system...
than students educated in a fairer and more objective environment," and their ability to develop
religious beliefs are adversely affected. Id. at 984-86. A student would "reasonably assume.., that
theistic religion is, at best, extraneous to an intelligent understanding of this country's history." Id.
at 985.
100 Id. at 953 (testimony of Dr. Halpin); id. at 957 (testimony of Dr. Baer); id. at 958 (testimony of
Dr. Coulson). For an explanation of humanistic psychology, seeid. at 952-54 (testimony of Dr. Hal-
pin). For an explanation of humanistic education and values clarification, see L. RATms, M. HARMIN,
AND S. SIMON, VALUES AND TEACHING (1966); Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal Implica-
tions of Values Education 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105, 114-32 (1978); Note, supra note 74, at 1204-11.
Values clarification is a seven-step method for teaching students how to develop values. The child
develops values by (1) choosing his values freely (2) from among alternatives (3) after giving
thoughtful consideration to the consequences of each alternative; the child should prize the choice
by (4) being happy with his choice and (5) affirming his choice publically; he should (6) act upon his
value choice (7) repeatedly, developing it into a pattern in his life. L. RAms, M. HARMIN, AND S.
SIMON, supra, at 28-30.
Humanists themselves have noted that values clarification can lead to relativism in morals:
[V]alues-clarification activities can lead to a rather relativistic view of moral decision mak-
ing. If young people are led to believe that decision making is only a matter of becoming
aware of their own feelings and if they realize, as most do, that other people have feelings
which are different from their own, they inevitably come to the conclusion that there are as
many good moral decisions as there are people and that no single decision can be shown to
be preferable to any other decision.
Hall, Moral Education Today: Progress, Prospects, and Problems of a Field Come of Age, 38 THE HUMANIST 9-
10 (Nov.-Dec. 1978). See also Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 959-60, 965 (testimony of Dr. Kurtz).
101 Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 986. Judge Hand made this finding because secular humanism and
humanistic psychology made the same faith statements. "Both deny the supernatural, both make
man the center of all existence, including morals formulation, both view man's sole collective and
individual purpose as fulfillment of his physical, temporal potential. Both view man as a completely
physical being, leaving no supernatural dimension. Such characteristics constitute a religious faith
. ...." Id. at 987. See also Note, supra note 74, at 1209 (premises of humanistic education and secular
humanism coincide).
102 Dr. Halpin stated that she did not equate secular humanism and humanistic psychology be-
cause she believed that the latter did not deny man's spiritual nature or the existence of God. Id. at
954. Dr. Paul Kurtz, drafter of Humanist Manifesto II and A Secular Humanist Declaration, also stated
that humanistic psychology and secular humanism are not the same. Id. at 965. According to Dr.
Kurtz, humanistic psychology believes that values are subjective and relative to the individual. Id.
Apparendy, secular humanism differs in that although secular humanism also believes that values
and morals are relative to man, it uses the objective criterion of the consequences of moral decisions
to reason to moral principles and values. P. KURTZ, supra note 58, at 28. See also Smith, 655 F. Supp.
at 965, 987 n.76. Judge Hand noted that although all secular humanists might not agree with all
tenets of humanistic psychology, this does not mean that humanistic psychology is not a variety of
secular humanism or a religion in its own right. Id. at 986. See also P. KURTZ, supra note 58, at 95-96,
where Dr. Kurtz implies that secular humanist educators are the promoters of values clarification and
moral development courses, although Dr. Kurtz does not believe that secular humanism is being
promoted by these courses.
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NOTES
and collectively."' 0 3 The court held that textbooks may not present a
faith based system as truth. 10 4 Since acceptance of the teachings would
require the student to make faith assumptions based on the teachings of
secular humanism, the court found an unconstitutional establishment of
secular humanism in the home economics textbooks. 10 5 Although the
defendants argued that only a small portion of the home economics text-
books dealt with values, Judge Hand noted that "a religion may not be
promoted through one chapter any more than through a whole book."106
For humanistic psychology to be taught constitutionally in the textbooks,
it could not be presented as truth, and other faith based systems would
have to be compared to it in the textbooks for their competing points of
view.' 0
7
Because the court found an establishment clause violation, the court
granted an injunction against the use of the history, social studies, and
home economics textbooks except as a reference source for a course in
comparative religions.' 08 The defendants appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
2. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
The Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of whether secular
humanism was a religion, for they held that no establishment clause vio-
lation had occured even assuming secular humanism was a religion. 10 9
Unlike the district court, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Lemon estab-
lishment clause test to the Alabama textbooks." 0 Since both parties
agreed that there was no question of a violation of the religious purpose
or excessive government entanglement prongs, the court limited itself to
a review of whether the textbooks had the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion."'
The court first reviewed the home economics textbooks. The court
determined that the effect prong had not been violated since the text-
books did not convey a message of governmental endorsement of secular
humanism but a message that the government approved of instilling val-
ues in its public school children. 1 2 Although the textbooks contained
ideas that were consistent with secular humanism, the court noted that
103 Id. at 986. The court gave as an example the teaching that students should determine right
and wrong based upon their own experience and values, and that values originate from within. The
court noted that this is a description of the origin of morals, and any description of the origin of
morals can only be a faith statement. Also, for the student to assume that the validity of a moral
choice was merely a matter of personal preference, he would have to assume that "self-actualization
is the goal of every human being, that man has no supernatural attributes or component, that there
are only temporal and physical consequences for man's actions, and that these results, alone, deter-
mine the morality of an action." Id. at 986-87.




108 Id. at 988-89.
109 Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987).
110 Id. at 689-90. See supra note 80 for the Lemon test.
111 Id. at 690.
112 Id. at 692.
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mere consistency with religious tenets did not constitute an establish-
ment clause violation.' 3 The court stated that the home economics text-
books were merely neutral toward religion rather than antagonistic, and
that some of the textbooks acknowledged that religion was a source of
morals and values."1
4
Turning to the history and social studies textbooks, the Eleventh
Circuit first stated that even assuming downplaying the role of religion in
American history was a tenet of secular humanism, any benefit to secular
humanism would only be incidental since anyone noting the absence of
facts about religion would not assume that Alabama was endorsing secu-
lar humanism or disapproving of theistic religions." 15 Since no message
of governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion existed, the
court concluded that the textbooks passed the effect prong and no estab-
lishment clause violation had occurred." 
6
IV. Analysis
A. A Comparison of Grove and Smith
As Judge Canby noted in his concurring opinion in Grove, a problem
in this area is the tendency of the plaintiffs to equate secular humanism
and antireligion." 7 Although one of the tenets of secular humanism is
antitheism, 118 plaintiffs err when they attribute every antireligious state-
ment they find in a book to secular humanism. Those holding antire-
ligious attitudes in our country extend well beyond those who believe in
secular humanism.
In Grove, most, if not all, of the statements in TheLearning Tree had no
connection to tenets of secular humanism other than being antire-
ligious.119 Similarly, in the history and social studies textbooks in Smith,
the plaintiffs showed no connection between the omissions of religion's
role in American history and secular humanism, other than noting that
113 Id. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319
(1980), reh'gdenied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
114 Smith, 827 F.2d at 692.
115 Id. at 693-94. The court thought that the message conveyed by the absence of facts about
religion was that "education officers . . . chose to use these particular textbooks because they
deemed them more relevant to the curriculum, or better written, or for some other nonreligious
reason found them to be best suited to their needs." Id.
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the district court's reliance on Epperson for its holding that
omitting historical facts about religion could be a first amendment violation was unfounded. The
court pointed out that in Epperson the Supreme Court found a violation of the purpose prong, but in
this case there was no question that the defendants had selected the textbooks for secular reasons.
Id. at 694. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for the district court's holding that omissions
could be a first amendment violation.
116 Id. at 693-94. Having found no violation of the establishment clause in either the home eco-
nomics or the social studies and history books, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and
dissolved the injunction against use of the textbooks. Id. at 695.
117 Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1985).
118 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
119 The appendix to the Ninth Circuit's decision contains a number of the passages the Grove
plaintiffs found objectionable. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1543-52. For a representative list, see supra note
78 and accompanying text.
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such omissions were antireligious. 120 Plaintiffs generally hurt their cases
when they fail to make this distinction between antireligion and secular
humanism, or at least between antireligion in general and antireligion
which has some connection to secular humanism. Failure to make this
distinction makes it appear as though plaintiffs are trying to purge the
schools of everything they find at all objectionable, which lessens their
credibility.
Because antireligious attitudes extend beyond those who believe in
secular humanism, antireligious statements or omissions alone will not
suffice to show an establishment of secular humanism. One would have
to at least show some actual connection between the antireligious state-
ments and secular humanism to make a credible claim. Because the his-
tory and social studies books in Smith had no such connection, these
books did not violate the establishment clause by endorsing secular
humanism. 121
The strongest claim of an establishment of secular humanism lies in
the home economics textbooks in Smith. Not only did the plaintiffs claim
that more tenets of secular humanism were being promoted than antireli-
gion, but they also showed that the sources of those statements had a
connection to secular humanism. The experts in Smith agreed that what
was being taught was humanistic psychology.122 Because humanistic psy-
chology is an outgrowth of secular humanism, 123 the plaintiffs showed
that the objectionable statements in the home economics textbooks were
connected to secular humanism, or at least a variety of secular human-
ism. Such a connection makes this a much stronger claim than the history
textbooks which had no such connection.
B. An Ultimate Concern/Faith Statement Analysis
Since neither the plaintiffs in Grove nor in Smith presented a compel-
ling case for showing lack of a secular purpose or excessive government
entanglement with religion, 124 their claims that secular humanism was
being promoted in the textbooks hinged on whether the primary effect of
the textbook passages was to advance secular humanism, the second
prong of the Lemon test.125 Violation of this primary effect prong occurs
120 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
121 Even though the history and social studies books in Smith did not endorse secular humanism,
the question still remains whether the omissions were so grave as to inhibit Christianity or establish a
religion of secularism. Likewise, even though the plaintiffs showed no connection between the an-
tireligious statements in the Grove textbook and secular humanism, the question still remains as to
whether the statements violated the establishment clause by inhibiting or showing hostility to Chris-
tianity rather than by endorsing secular humanism. This note expresses no opinion on this issue as
it is beyond the scope of this note. But see infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of why the Grove textbook does not violate the establishment clause.
122 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 83-84, 111 and accompanying text.
125 The test with this prong should be whether the primary effect of the passages in question
promotes secular humanism rather than whether the primary effect of the whole textbook is to pro-
mote secular humanism. For instance, if a math textbook endorsed the statement "Jesus Christ is
God come in the flesh," in an isolated passage, this statement would clearly violate the establishment
clause. However, in analyzing the statement through the Lemon test, the statement does not violate
the purpose prong if the state chose the book for the valid secular reason that it believed the book
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when government appears to be endorsing or disapproving religion, re-
gardless of government's actual purpose.1 26 The question, then, is what
is required in order to find government endorsement of religion where
such textbooks are used in public schools.
First, textbooks will not contain government endorsement of reli-
gion when the "religious" literature is being used objectively for its liter-
ary and historical qualities.' 27 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was correct
in Grove to find no establishment clause violation.' 28 Even if the charac-
ters in the novel The Learning Tree were endorsing secular humanism or
inhibiting Christianity,' 29 the government would not have the appear-
ance of endorsing or disapproving religion because the school used the
textbook objectively as part of a literature class rather than promoting
the beliefs as truth.' 30
Second, textbooks will not contain government endorsement of reli-
gion merely because the teaching coincides with particular religious ten-
ets.' 3 ' The question, then, is when will such teaching be considered to
have merely coincided with religious tenets and when will it be considered
to have endorsed religious tenets? Must the textbooks systematically pro-
mote the belief system as a whole to have gone beyond mere coincidence
as the district court stated in Smith?'
3 2
Requiring the textbooks to systematically promote the belief system
as a whole before finding endorsement would require too much. For in-
stance, if a science textbook merely stated that God exists, and promoted
effectively taught math principles rather than because of the statement being in the book, nor would
it violate the entanglement prong since no reason exists to believe that the statement in the textbook
would serve to entangle the government with any particular religious organization. Therefore, the
statement must violate the effect prong. But it could only do so if the primary effect test deals with
the effect of the particular passage rather than the textbook as a whole. The primary effect of the
textbook as a whole is obviously to teach math. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in Grove erred when it
stated that part of the reason THE LEARNING TREE did not violate the establishment clause was be-
cause only a small part of the book discussed religion and that the primary effect of the book must
therefore be secular. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534. Even if only a small part of the book discussed reli-
gion, the court should have focused on the primary effect of those particular passages.
126 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.42 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
127 It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic quali-
ties. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consist-
ently with the First Amendment.
Arlington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
42 (1980) ("Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion or the like."), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
128 See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 75-78, 89-90 and accompanying text. "The more closely the manner of teach-
ing resembles indoctrination, the more likely that it violates the establishment clause. Conversely,
the more closely the manner of teaching resembles unfettered analytical inquiry, the less likely that it
violates the establishment clause." Strossen, "Secular Humanism " and "Scientific Creationism " Proposed
Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 333, 382
(1986).
131 "However, it is equally true that the 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
132 Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F.Supp. 939, 983 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd,
827 F.2d 684 (1Ith Cir. 1987).
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this statement as truth, this statement alone would clearly endorse reli-
gion in violation of establishment clause even though it promotes no be-
lief system as a whole. The reason this statement would go beyond
coinciding with religious tenets by actually endorsing religious tenets is
because the statement that God exists is a statement of faith dealing with
an issue of ultimate concern, one of the fundamental questions. If, on
the other hand, the textbook merely promoted the statement that one
should not commit murder, this would not violate the establishment
clause, because although it deals with an issue of ultimate concern, the
proper moral code of right and wrong, it is not a statement of faith.
Many reasons not based on faith can be given for the proposition that
one should not commit murder, so this merely coincides with religious
tenets. 
13 3
If textbooks promote as truth faith statements on matters of ultimate
concern, these statements will not merely coincide with religion, but will
give government the appearance of endorsing religion. This standard
makes sense since the most important characteristic in finding a belief
system to be a religion is whether it gives answers to the questions of
ultimate concern. 134 One would expect that if textbooks promoted as
truth any religion's answers to questions of ultimate concern, it would in
effect be endorsing that religion.
The Smith home economics textbooks taught an area of ultimate
concern-the proper moral code of right and wrong. Teaching the stu-
dent that only he could decide what was right and wrong and that values
are personal and subjective was promoting a faith statement as truth.13 5
Whether morals and values are relative to man or have an absolute exter-
nal reference is a matter of faith, not one susceptible to proof. The home
economics textbooks in Smith went beyond merely coinciding with the
tenets of secular humanism; they endorsed its tenets, and the district
court properly issued an injunction against them.
13 6
The Eleventh Circuit erred in Smith when it held that the home eco-
nomics textbooks did not convey a message of government endorsement
133 "Thus, for temporal purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact that this agrees with the dictates
of the Judaeo-Christian religions while it may disagree with others does not invalidate the regula-
tion." McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
134 See supra notes 32-36, 39-42 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. In Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, No. 87-1100 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1988), Judge Boggs noted in his
concurring opinion that
The most difficult case would be if the state were teaching "critical reading" in the sense
that plaintiffs were told to believe (or were downgraded for not believing) that values comes
from within oneself, rather than from an external religious source. If this were the case, I
think it clear that such teaching would violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 1076-77 (Boggs, J., concurring). Teaching of values clarification is a particular threat to reli-
gious private choice "in the public school context because pre-college students may lack the capacity
to reflect maturely on the programs' messages or to resist peer pressure, and because the schools
themselves are inherently authoritarian." Note, supra note 74, at 1210.
136 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Moskowitz, supra note 100, at 124-26
(teachings of values clarification which show hostility to religion violate the purpose prong of the
Lemon test, and teaching of ethical relativism violates the effect prong); Note, supra note 74, at 1211
n. 77 (some humanistic education teaching, including some of the values clarification, has the pri-
mary effect of inhibiting religion).
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of secular humanism, but only a message that the government approved
of instilling values in school children. 137 While the home economics
textbooks did indeed convey such a message, if those values were the
values of secular humanism, the government was also conveying a
message of government endorsement of secular humanism.
The Supreme Court has noted the importance of instilling values in
school children through the educational system.' 38 Since the govern-
ment cannot promote any faith statement on matters of ultimate concern,
it follows that when government teaches students the proper moral code
of right and wrong, a matter of ultimate concern, it must avoid teaching
faith statements as truth. This can be accomplished by either avoiding
the making of a faith statement altogether as to why a particular mode of
conduct is correct, or, if a faith statement is given, by not promoting the
faith statement as truth but clearly labeling it as a theory. 39
V. Conclusion
The lack of a comprehensive definition of religion under the first
amendment hampers analysis of the claim that secular humanism is being
endorsed in public school textbooks. However, if religion is defined us-
ing the more expansive criteria articulated by the Supreme Court, secular
humanism appears to fall into the category of religion because of its com-
prehensive answers to questions of ultimate concern and its moral code,
as well as the limited amount of religious structure and ritual.
Whether the public school textbooks are actually promoting secular
humanism is also not clear. The area has been confused by plaintiffs who
137 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
138 Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986).
139 See Moskowitz, supra note 100, at 136 (schools should limit themselves to teaching values
which are "necessary for the sustenance and preservation of our modem state [and] one of the
bulwarks of democratic government"); Note, supra note 74, at 1223 (schools could teach morality
without burdening the establishment clause by avoiding controversial moral issues and presenting
issues in such a way as to avoid biasing the student against possible external absolutes). Since the
state can teach a faith statement if it does not teach it as truth but instead clearly labels it as theory,
the state does not violate the effect prong of the establishment clause test by teaching evolution.
Textbooks clearly label evolution as theory, so even though evolution ultimately rests on faith as-
sumptions (that matter and life came into existence where once no matter and life existed without
the aid of a transcendent being) and deals with an ultimate concern (the origin of life), the state
avoids endorsement of these faith claims by teaching evolution as theory.
However, Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) notes that the purpose of teaching such a
theory cannot be to promote a particular religious viewpoint. In Edwards, the Supreme Court struck
down a Louisiana law which stated that Louisiana public schools which taught either evolution or
creation science had to teach both theories. Id. at 2575-76, 2583. The Court held that the law
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test because the purpose behind the law was to further the
religious doctrine of creation. Id. at 2582-83. But the Court noted that had the state not required
the teaching of creation science for the purpose of promoting a religion but instead to enhance
science instruction that the state could validly have required the teaching of creation science and
other scientific theories of the origin of life. So long as the state purpose in teaching a theory of the
origin of man is not to promote a religion, it can validly be taught if taught as theory and not as
truth. However, one can certainly argue that the Edwards court erred in their application of the
Lemon test. Under the purpose prong, all that must be found is a valid secular purpose, not the
absence of any religious purpose. Id. at 2593-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If evidence exists that con-
tradicts the theory of evolution, the state surely has a valid secular purpose in seeing to it that school
children be presented with evidence of both scientific theories since it would help them to under-
stand the current state of evidence on the origin of life.
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fail to distinguish between statements in the textbooks which actually
promote tenets of secular humanism and those which are merely antire-
ligious. While making antireligious statements or ignoring religion's role
in history might establish a religion of secularism or impermissibly in-
hibit Christianity, such statements do not establish the religion of secular
humanism. However, values education in the public school textbooks
does appear to promote secular humanism. The teaching of values clari-
fication violates the establishment clause because it is an outgrowth of
humanistic philosophy and is based upon the answers to questions of
ultimate concern and the faith claims of the adherents of secular
humanism.
Lawsuits claiming an establishment of secular humanism will proba-
bly not be a panacea for concerned plaintiffs. Much of what they find
objectionable in the public schools cannot be clearly traced to actual
teaching of secular humanism. However, when the tenets of secular hu-
manism are promoted as truth in the textbooks, courts should not hesi-
tate to find a violation of the establishment clause. If the government is
to truly maintain a position of neutrality toward religion, it cannot en-
dorse the faith claims of any religion, whether centered on God or man.
B. Douglas Hayes
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